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The landslip is located in the Giant’s Seat Woods area of Kearsley, Bolton in Greater Manchester, England.  The ground 
conditions at the site comprise made ground material over mudstones of the Manchester Marls.  An area of land crossed by Red 
Rock Lane had, since the late 1700s, experienced land slip resulting in the ground generally moving south towards the adjacent 
river.  By the late 1990’s the movement of the slip had resulted in fractures and fissures under the road and damage to several 
other services.  A project was developed to stabilise the land along approximately 130m of Red Rock Lane. 
 
Options to provide a solution included service diversion, improved drainage, toe weighting, dig out and replace, soil nailing, 
piled wall and a rock anchored pile wall.  The ground conditions and compact nature of the site suggested that a drilled minipile 
and anchored wall would offer the optimum performance. 
 
Inclinometer results confirmed clearly that the slip surface lay predominantly within the mudstones, moving at up to 40mm a 
month, at depths ranging between 3 and 10m below road level.  Continued monitoring of the inclinometers and piezometers 
through construction of the wall provided interesting and useful results regarding the slip behaviour and was finally able to  





This paper presents a history of a failing slope and the 
development and implementation of a geotechnical solution to 
arrest the movement.  From desk study work the early history 
of local slope failure is tracked, changes of land use are 
detailed along with review of monitoring, investigation and 
testing of the slip.  The case history then follows the decision 
making process to determine a stabilising solution and finally 
details the design, construction and monitoring of the mini-
piled wall used to prevent further failure.  The post-
constructional movements of the slope and wall are contrasted 




Giant’s Seat Landslip 
Manchester  
The relatively modest scale of the project is in contrast with 
the depth of historic desk study information available. In 
addition, the completeness of the records and the clarity of 
results of the slip monitoring allow a ready appreciation of the 
geotechnical problem and the response of the slip to treatment. 
London • 
 
The case history runs from about 1790 through to present day.  
The slip is located along Red Rock Lane, Kearsley, Bolton in 
the UK. Figure 1 indicates the approximate location within the 
UK.  The road cut by the slip links Ringley Fold Wastewater 
Treatment  Works  and  Rhodes  sewage farm, it  also provides  
Fig. 1. Location of Giant’s Seat Landslip 
 
the sole access to Giants Seat Horticultural Nursery.  To the 
north of the road is the previous course of the Manchester 
Bolton & Bury Canal, now in filled, and a steeply sloping 
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wooded area of land Giant’s Seat Wood. The steep sloping 




SUMMARY OF THE PROBLEM 
 
 
In the UK there are likely to be many natural slopes with a 
factor of safety (FoS) close to unity.  Most of these are not in 
urban areas, but where slips occur which compromise human 
activities consideration is required as to how to geotechnicaly 
manage the risk of failure, and to develop strategies and 
solutions to do so. 
 
The Giant’s Seat Landslip, although in a semi-rural area, 
affects a number of infrastructure and service assets.  The slip 
has been managed through a combination of monitoring, 
investigation and  finally  stabilisation  measures.  At the point  
Fig.2. Site Location indicating the area of slip movement, the 
location of boreholes and the line of the stabilising wall. 
in time that the decision was taken to stabilise the slip the 
failure zone potentially affected: 
  
• Telephone lines 
• Electricity Lines 
• A Road – used by general public and sludge tankers 
• A Sludge Main 
• A Sewer Pipeline. 
. 
Figure 2. shows the location of the site and the area that had 
exhibited ground movement, problems with services and 
cracking and settlement of the road.  
 
In the past the movement of the slip had necessitated repairs to 
a number of these services.  The following sections examine 
the history of the slip, it’s change of use and the build up of 
data and information required to properly manage the risk and 
develop sufficient knowledge of the failure mechanism and 
geometry  in  order  to  provide  a  solution  to the problem.  A  
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crucial early phase in geotechnical work is the desk study.  
This can provide essential base information with regard to the 





The British Geological Survey maps covering the site, Sheet 
85 solid and drift (scale 1:63,360) and a ‘geological diagram’ 
produced for the Bolton Regional Sewerage Scheme (dated 
1949), indicate the following geological succession: 
 
Alluvial Deposits - located to the south side of the river 
Glacial Clay - located to the north of the site area 
Sherwood Sandstone - south of the river underlying Alluvium 
Manchester Marl  - noted to be underlying part of the site 
and identified as ‘formerly exposed red 
Marl’.  
 
Earlier maps from 1826 and 1929 have slightly differing 
boundaries to the extent of the Sandstone that overlies the 
Manchester Marl.  It maybe that river erosion and progressive 
movement of the slip down slope had made mapping and 
interpretation from outcrop more difficult. 
 
There is reasonable agreement from all three maps that the 
Marl and Sandstone to the north east of the river dip at about 
12-15o in the direction of the river.   
 
The term marl has been used to describe a variety of materials 
although it is the common description for rock with 35-65% 
carbonate and a complementary proportion of clay.  However, 
in the UK material referred to as marls often have a 
substantially lower proportion of carbonate material 
(commonly less than 20%) and may be more aptly described 
as marly clays or mudstones; in this paper this is the type of 
material described as marl. 
 
Evidence of past mining in the area is apparent with former 
clay pits shown to the north of the site area and a colliery to 
the south side of the River Irwell.   
 
 
History of Land Use 
 
Prior to the Industrial Revolution the site area was rural.  The 
late eighteenth century was a period of rapid development of 
the canal system in order to serve the newly establishing 
industries.  The location of the site was one of the key areas 
for such development and along the Irwell Valley two Canals 
were constructed.  One on the south bank was called 
Fletcher’s Canal that provided a link from a colliery to the 
larger Manchester Bolton & Bury (MBB) Canal that ran on 
the north side of the Irwell valley and through the site.  Both 
these are seen on Fig. 3. based upon the 1907 map that also 
shows the location of several structures to the south of the 




Fig.3. Site map in 1907 showing the MBB canal (site within 
circle) 
 
Also seen on the 1907 map is a Clay Pit.  Such pits can 
commonly be found close to the canal system associated with 
puddle clay sealing of the canals.  However, in this case, based 
upon the chronology of maps the clay pit significantly 
postdates the canal.  A pipe, perhaps overflow, ran from the 
water filled former clay pit to the north side of the canal.  On 
later maps the clay pit is identified as a pond.    
 
The canal remained operational from the 1790s until the 1960s 
when the British Transport Commission classed it as "a 
waterway having insufficient commercial prospects to justify 
their retention for navigation”.  In reality the canal had a 
history of significant bursts and two in the 1930s were 
significant enough to cause a dramatic drop in water traffic.  
From this time onward various lengths were infilled, some 
during the second word war and additionally during post war 
periods.  The bursts are of interest with regard to slope 
stability assessment.  The canal was generally built side long 
to the valley side with cut to the up slope generally forming 
fill on the downward slope that thus created the channel for 
the canal.  The closest burst to the Giant’s Seat failure was 
about 2km to the southeast.  Contemporary reports from the 
1930s suggest that seepage of the canal water caused softening 
at the soil/rock interface leading to failure of the down slope 
fill side of the canal and causing the breach. 
 
Since backfilling of the canal in the vicinity of Giants Seat a 
road was constructed between the line of the canal and the 
river.  Further fill was added to make up the road to this level 
along with construction of some sandstone walls to retain the 
fill and road.  Additional uncontrolled tipping appeared to 
have taken place on the slope down from the road to the river 
predominantly at the east end of the site. 
 
Utility providers took advantage of the line of the previous 
canal and along alignment installed a sewer pipe and sludge 
main in part cut and part fill construction.  With increasing 
development local supplies of power, water and telephone 
lines utilised the road corridor for their routings. 
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Formal and informal monitoring of the slip movement, repair 
of the assets, consideration of desk study information and 
direct investigation has been ongoing over the past 30 years.  
It is convenient however, to consider three main phases of 
work in the 1970’s, 1980s and then the late 1990’s. 
 
In the 1970’s a limited site investigation proved the thickness 
of the filled ground below the road level and also, 
significantly, that the underlying rock was substantially Marl.  
Of the earlier geological maps, that of 1826 appeared to offer 
the most accurate representation of the conditions 
encountered.  However, the marl passes by ‘transition’ in to 
the overlying sandstone and so at the top of the marl 
increasing frequency of marly sandstone and sandstone bands 
can be anticipated.  The postulated failure mechanism was 
sliding at the interface of the Fill and the Marl.  The potential 
for a temporarily high water table due to river levels or heavy 
rain was observed to reduce the factor of safety (FoS), 
although factual records of groundwater levels did not suggest 
that such high levels occurred.  It was also considered that 
water could cause softening of the marl.  An interesting 
observation based on ‘local knowledge’ was that the onset or 
increase in rate of slip movement occurred after periods of wet 
weather. 
 
By the early 1980’s it was apparent that some additional 
drainage measures had not had curtailed the slip movement 
and further repairs to cracking and settlement of the road and 
damaged services had been required.  A further phase of field 
walkovers, site investigation and reporting was undertaken.  
At this stage the possibility of a long established, deeper 
seated, failure surface was suggested.  The theoretical and site 
investigation work concentrated more closely upon the 
geometry of the marl beds, their description and nature in 
cores and their material properties. 
 
Additional groundwater level monitoring was undertaken and 
a review of the available ground movements collated by the 
utility provider was initiated.  The site investigation involved 
the installation of several piezometers and shear tubes and  
obtained cored and undisturbed samples of the marl.  Detailed 
description of these samples indicated the presence of  
‘slicken’ or polished surfaces, shear and slip surfaces.  These 
details were used to assist in development of the likely depth 
and extent of the failure surface along which movement had 
occurred and to prepare a contour plot of the failure surface.  
Detailed analysis of the rock cores by the Institution of 
Geological Sciences indicated the likely presence of a NNE-
SSE fault that was likely to limit the eastern boundary of the 
slip. 
 
Site inspection indicated a potential zone of heaved material 
within the river channel at the eastern end of the slip.  As the 
slip was on an outward bend of the River Irwell it was 
considered that removal of toe material and previously higher 
water table levels had potentially initiated slope failure.  It was 
considered that as this movement had occurred over such a 
long period of time marl shear strength parameters would have 
been progressively reduced to near the residual condition at 
the shear surface.  Two ring shear tests were undertaken which 
provided results of Φ’r of 13.7 o and 15.5 o with respective 
values for C’r of 7.5 and 0 kN/m2.  Although the dip of the 
rock in the slip zone is relatively shallow, about 14o, it can be 
seen that quite small changes in the level of the water table 
could initiate the onset of movement if the marl at the shear 
surface was at or close to residual strength values.  Such a 
mechanism would fit that described from local knowledge 
noted in the 1970s. 
 
In both the 1970s work and that in the 1980s the movement of 
the slope during the site operations was reported.  However 
the degree of movement was not so clearly established, 
although the surface movement in the 1980s was in the order 
of 5-6mm/month. 
 
At the completion of the 1980s phase of work some discussion 
took place with the utility owner over potential risks and 
actions.  Having identified a link between increase in 
groundwater level and slip movement, the possibility of 
improved drainage was identified as an option.  However, the 
measured piezometric levels were little above the river water 
level and indeed much of the slip surface was below the level 
of the river.  This was discounted as likely to provide only 
marginal benefits.  Previous drainage measures had also not 
had a marked effect on stability.  Toe weighting was 
considered, although the geometry of the site was a constraint 
and much of the additional load, if it were to provide 
maximum benefit, would impinge on the river channel and 
probably influence flows. 
 
It was considered that, due to probable impracticability and 
inefficiency, conventional slope stabilisation were unlikely to 
meet the requirements for this problem.  Direct enhancement 
of the shearing resistance along the slip plane was likely to 
offer the best means of restoring long-term stability to the 
mass that had slipped.  Piles were considered, although 
potential slip down slope of any shear key piles would leave  
the possibility of them needing to work in cantilever.  This, it 
was considered, would potentially require a larger pile size 
than that simply required for increase in shear resistance.  It 
was advised that this approach would entail considerable 
expenditure and major disruption during the work that would 
require road closure. 
      
The alternative offered at this stage was to provide a seating 
for the pipelines that would offer the possibility of jacking and 
adjusting their position in response to slip movement and to 
avoid future bursts and leakage.   
 
Neither of these two options was adopted.  However, advice to 
continue monitoring of the slip movement was followed, not 
least as the assets remained vulnerable to future movement 
and the possibility remained, although considered unlikely, of 
a large dramatic failure. 
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By 1995 continued movement of the slip had caused further 
problem with the pipelines and significant settlement and 
cracking of the road.  Several phases of repair work had been 
undertaken. 
 
Further review of the problem involved: 
 
• Design of a final phase of investigation sufficient to 
confirm specific data relating to the slip such as the 
depth of shear surface and rate of movement.  The 
extent and nature of the site investigation was to be 
suited to the anticipated geotechnical process selected 
for stabilisation. 
• Establish instrumentation that could be used to 
monitor slip movements before, during and after 
stabilisation works. 
• Develop an evaluation report of stabilisation options 
utilising all available information and data. 
• Following these stages the preferred option was to be 
developed to a full design. 
 
The options for stabilisation were considered in parallel to the 
design of the additional site investigation.  The site 
investigation included further cored boreholes and installation 
of five inclinometers.  The depth of investigation was intended 
to intercept the likely failure surface and the instrumentation 
was to detect the depth and degree of  movement of the slip. 
 
Later sections of the paper, indicate that the instrumentation 
was used to accurately establish the depth of the failure plane 
within the marl at the selected locations.  The groundwater 
level within the marl was found to be between 0 and 2m above 
the river level (Approximately 34mAOD).   
 
 
Summary of Failure Model 
 
From evaluation of the desk study and site investigation 
information the following summarises the factors that are 
considered to have potentially contributed to slope instability 
at Giant’s Seat: 
 
1. Removal of slope toe material by the River Irwell causing 
initial instability 
2. Further removal of slope toe material by the river causing 
continued instability and increased movement. 
3. During the period of high river levels, the strata would 
become saturated with water.  Unless able to drain out 
again quickly, keeping pace with the subsequent falls in 
river level, the effective weight of the strata overlying the 
potential failure plane dipping towards the river was 
temporarily increased.  
4. Slipped material and debris would be developed and shear 
surfaces thus formed within the marl as a result of the 
large strain movements involved would tend to gradually 
reduce the soil parameters (cohesion and angle of 
shearing resistance) to their residual values. 
5. Construction of the canal in the 1780-90s provided a 
potential source of seepage water, potentially percolating 
through sandstone bands within the marl. 
6. Additional weight of fill forming the down slope bank of 
the canal and towing path. 
7. Additional weight of fill from backfilling of the canal and 
overfilling to the pipelines. 
8. Seepage water introduced into the area of canal backfill 
from the pond overflow pipe.  
9. Additional weight of fill from build up for the road 
construction. 
10. Uncontrolled filling adjacent to the road. 
 
Many of these changes in the distribution of loads and pore 
water or seepage pressures whilst in themselves being 
relatively small, could nevertheless have been of significance 
in the state of critical or limiting stability which probably 
existed at various stages in the development of the slip. 
 
Figure 4. is a section through the site from the river in the 
south to the pond in the north.  The significant depth of the fill 
materials above the marl can be seen.  The base of the fill was 
initially believed to be the possible failure plane.  The location 
of the pond and overflow pipe is indicated along with the 
‘design’ slip surface in the marl.  The approximate zone where 
various tension cracks had been noticed over the years has 
also been illustrated. 
 
 
DECISION TO STABILISE THE SLOPE AND SELECTION 
OF THE OPTIMUM TECHNIQUE  
 
 
A number of factors prevailed in arriving at the decision to 
stabilise the slope.  The slip movement was continuing and 
further repairs to services and the road were likely and a more 
permanent solution would allow the adoption of a routine 
maintenance approach.  Re-routing of the pipelines was not 
possible within the current land ownership and would not 
solve the potential problem of future road failure.  The 
possibility of accelerated or more severe failure, although 
considered a low risk, could not be ruled out.  The 
consequences of a burst in the pipelines and any disruption at 
the treatment plants were becoming more severe. 
 
Consideration was given to selection of the optimum form of 
stabilisation measure.  Prior to detailed design three options 
were developed to a level that allowed comparison of the 
major factors considered in selection of the design solution.  
These factors were Certainty of Success, Durability, 
Constructability, Schedule/Programming, Environmental 
Impact and Cost. 
 
The three methods considered to this level were: 
 
• Toe weighting with fill and regrading 
• Soil Nailing    
• A Mini-Piled wall along with raking tension 
piles/anchors 
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The toe weighting was to involve construction of a 3m high 
stone bund retaining additional benches of fill.  The second 
and third options followed the approach of providing direct 
improvement at the shear surface.  The minipile wall was 
envisaged to provide one long shear key across the failure 
surface.  There is often debate as to the exact load transfer 
mechanism of soil nails although in this case it is reasonable to 
consider that they would offer tensile reinforcement across the 
failure surface and in addition some additional shear resistance 
would be provided.  For the preliminary assessment of the 
options a 120m long piled wall was considered along the side 
of the road closest to the river.   The concept considered for 
the soil nails involved installation of about 1000 nails both up 
and down slope of the existing road.   
 
Whilst it was considered that each of these options could be 
engineered to provide an improvement, the mini-piled wall 
was determined as the preferred option.  There were 
considered to be distinct advantages with regard to the degree 
of existing tree and woodland clearance, the likely achievable 
improvement in factor of safety and a perceived lower risk 
strategy.  It was also decided that using this option would 
allow the road to remain operational, at least as single lane, 
throughout the work. 
 
Fig. 4. Section through the Giant’s Seat Landslip (the design 
slip surface is indicated as are the approximate locations of  
boreholes, mini-pile wall and anchors) 
   
 




Having identified the Mini-piled wall as the appropriate 
option, two phases of design were undertaken.  The first 
involved consideration of the overall slope stability and the 
effect of the wall as a sheer key.  The second stage concerned 





It had been identified that the crucial factors likely to be 
influencing the slope stability were the residual soil shear 
strength parameters and the ground water level and, in 
particular, temporary rises in the ground water level. 
 
In preparing the slip model for analysis, information regarding 
the depth of failure surface was provided by the 
instrumentation installed in 1996.  Figures 5. and 6. illustrate 
the inclinometer results in two of the boreholes next to the 
road alignment.  The lines on the plot represent regular 
readings indicating progressive increase in deflections over a 
period of about 8 to 9 months.  A clear displacement of the 
ground can be seen just above the failure surface.   
 
Along with the depth of the failure surface a design value of 
the residual shear strength parameters was decided upon.  Two 
ring shear tests in 1995 supplemented the earlier tests and 
provided  results  of Φ’r of 12.5 o, similar  to  the  earlier work, 
and 31 o.  The samples had been taken to represent the marl, 
but examination of the last sample of material revealed that 
there was much fine sand in the sample and this is the 
probable cause of the single high result.  A representative 
value of Φ’r of 15 o was taken for design with C’r of 0 kN/m2. 
 
For the groundwater level some further assumption was 
required. All ground water level monitoring indicated a 
relatively low piezometric level and the base design case was 
to set ground water level in the proximity of the river at the 
river level (34mAOD) rising to about 1.5-2m above this level 
about 50m away from the river.  Highest flood level at the 
river from historic records was 37.5mAOD.  For the worst-
case condition, a level of 44mAOD was selected at about 50-
60m from the river representing water almost at ground level 
at the location of the backfilled canal.  This model was taken 
to represent a case following poor weather accompanied by 
highest discharge from the pond into the area of the old canal.  
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Fig. 5. Inclinometer readings over 9 month period BH603. 
 
 
The slope stability package STABLE by MZ Associates, 
allowing Bishop circular and later Morgenstern and Price and 
Sarma non-circular methods, was used for the analyses. 
 
Analysis of the failure plane at various sections through the 
slip was undertaken and one of the sections is included as Fig. 
4. At each of these sections four main design cases were 
considered: 
 
• The base case groundwater level close to the river 
level (GW – Low).  
• High temporary groundwater level close to ground 
level at the location of the backfilled canal (GW – 
High). 
• The GW – High condition with the benefit of the wall 
constructed and providing a shear key. 
• The Portion of the slip downhill from the wall 
analysed with GW – High.   
 
The last design case assumes that the uphill portion of the slip 
is stabilised and the assets protected although the lower slope  
Fig.6. Inclinometer readings over 9 month period BH604. 
 
 
receives no direct shear enhancement.  Improvement of the 
lower slope factor of safety is mainly achieved through a 
change in the balance of driving forces (reduced by the 
provision of the wall) to the available resisting forces 
(unchanged).  A lower factor of safety was considered 
acceptable for this portion of the slope than that for the slope 
as a whole as certain other design conditions were modelled I 
the detailed wall design phase. The stability results are 
summarised below: 
 
Table 1. Summary of stability Analysis Results 
 
 
Average Results of Stability Analysis 
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It can be seen that in normal ‘dry weather’ condition of the 
slip is stable but that an increase in groundwater level causes a 
significant decrease in the factor of safety to a marginal level 
of instability.  However, in this case it is the relative reduction 
in FoS that is significant, as is the relative increase that can be 
seen provided by the construction of the wall in the model.  
The slip downhill from the wall under high groundwater level 





In terms of the slope stability the main purpose of the wall was 
to provide shear enhancement across the slip plane.  From the 
overall stability analysis a shear force of 650kN per metre of 
wall was required to provide the factors of safety detailed in 
the previous section.  In order to satisfy the space constraints 
of the site, and to minimise temporary loading on the slip, one 
hundred and seventy 220mm diameter mini-piles were 
selected for construction of the wall at 600mm centre to centre 
spacing.  To resist the shear force, at about 11m down the pile 
shaft, the selected full-length reinforcement was a 140mm OD 
steel circular hollow section grouted with a sand and cement 
grout inside and outside the tube.  Embedment beyond the 
failure plane ranged from 4-10m. The sensitivity of the slip to 
build up in water level was carefully considered and it was 
specified that the wall should include ‘gaps’ between the piles 
equivalent to 30% of the length of the wall evenly distributed 
along the wall length.  The permeability of the gaps between 
the piles was to be maintained to at least the prevailing value. 
 
Thus the wall provides the improvement in shear capacity at 
the slip plane.  However, although the FOS for the lower slope 
below the wall was improved it was recognised that it was 
lower than the overall FOS.  An additional design case was 
considered assuming that down slope of the minipile wall the 
ground moved away (either as failure or tension crack) from 
contact with the wall to a depth of 4-5m.  A capping beam 
with 40 ground anchors was also included in the design 
although it was recognised that the anchors would not need to 
work at their full design capacity unless the specific design 
condition arose in service.  All anchors were to be tested to 
prove their design capacity.  The 32mm double corrosion 
protected ground anchors had a design fixed length of 10m 
and a free length 15m and were designed at 2.4m centre-to-
centre spacing. The location of the wall capping beam and 
anchors is indicated on the section in Fig. 4.  
 
The wall was modelled using the OASYS programme FREW.  
This is a programme used to analyse the behaviour of flexible 
retaining walls and appropriate in the case of the mini-piled 
wall with passive (not substantially post tensioned) ground 
anchors requiring the modelling of a number of stages/design 
cases.   
 
Inclinometers were been installed in the investigation 
boreholes.  The design of the permanent works also 
incorporated the facility to install inclinometers in the piles, 
and in the gaps between, in order to monitor the deflections of 
the completed structure.  
 
 




The inclinometers installed in the last phase of site 
investigation had clearly identified the failure surface and 
confirmed that movement was ongoing.  In these 
circumstances the continued monitoring of the slip during and 
after completion of the stabilisation work was considered an 
essential aspect of the project. 
 
In addition to the wall the work required reconstruction of the 
road over a length of about 130m although to minimise the 
additional load added to the slip the surface was to remain at 
the settled level and regraded to smoothly link with the road 
outside the slip zone.  The contractor’s programme involved a 
staggered approach to pile construction to increase in shear 
capacity over a wide area early in the construction phase. 
 
Rotary drilling and down hole hammer work with air flush 
were used to form the piles and anchors (Fig. 7.).  These 
techniques can have a detrimental effect on the friction 
capacity of pile and anchors in marly ground due to smearing 
and the air flush can be potentially disruptive to shear 
surfaces.  However due to the sensitivity of the slip to 
groundwater levels  it was  considered that carefully controlled  
 
Fig. 7. Anchor installation work from temporary staging 
(Mini-pile wall capping cage visible in foreground) 
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air flushing techniques were preferred in this case.  None of 
the potential difficulties with this flushing medium in the site 
soils were encountered. 
 
A particular challenge of the work at this site was to achieve a 
balance between maintaining adequate grout cover to the pile 
steel and ensuring that the ‘permeability’ gap between the 
piles was maintained and not grouted as a consequence of pile 
construction. 
 
In addition to the inclinometer checking during the 
construction phase the ground water levels were also 
monitored.  Construction work commenced in March 1997.   
Three to four later a significant rise in groundwater level was 
noted in the piezometer in BH603. This borehole is on the 
uphill side of the wall.  Over the same period it was noted that 
the rate of slip movement increased from about 15mm/month 
to about 28-40mm/month.  Figure 8. shows the cumulative 
movement of the inclinometers at a specific depth.  The 
change in slip rate can be seen occurring from about May1997 
onwards.  Included on the same plot is the relative behaviour 
of the piezometer in BH603 showing the rise, of about 2m in 
water level, over the same period of time. 
 
Fig. 8. Slip movement against time indicating change in rate 
of slip due to groundwater level rise and curtailment of 
movement at completion of piling in late June early July 1997. 
 
Permanent sleeves were included in the pile shaft through the 
fill materials to control the grout seepage and maintain cover 
to the steel in the pile.  In order to prevent further groundwater 
level increase, and if possible reduce it, the gaps between the 
piles in the vicinity of BH603 were drilled and the gaps filled 
with gravel. 
 
It can not be determined conclusively that the increased failure 
rate was due to increased groundwater levels, recorded in one 
of the piezometers.  However, the two occurred at the same 
time and it had been established theoretically, and through 
historical reports, that the slip was very sensitive to 
groundwater level fluctuation.  Furthermore, from Fig 8. it can 
be seen that, after the work to improve gap permeability, the 
groundwater level BH603 rapidly returned to its steady level 
and this is followed by a slowing of the rate of movement of 
the slip.  Again these events are very likely to be connected 
although, at this stage of the project, the rate of slip movement 
was also being slowed by an increasing number of installed 
piles.  Figure 9. shows the piezometer readings from the 
boreholes monitored during construction 
 
The rate of slip movement began to slow about 3 months into 
the construction of the wall and, as can be seen form Fig. 8. 
had   effectively   been   curtailed   after  4-5   months  of   pile  
 
installation.  This was also the stage that reading could 
commence in the inclinometers installed in the piles and gaps 
of the wall.  From June to the end of October 1997 no 
significant movement was recorded within the remaining site 
investigation borehole inclinometers or those inclinometers 
installed in the piles and gaps.  Groundwater levels also 
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remained steady over the same period.  A further reading of 
the instruments late1998/early1999 confirmed that there had 
not been movement of the slip mass since the installation of 
the wall. 
 
Fig. 9. Groundwater level monitoring from piezometers in the 




In 2003 a visual inspection of the site was made.  In years 
prior to the wall installation regular repairs had been required 
to the road and services.  In 2003 the inspection revealed no 
cracking or distress to the road surface and no reports of 
damaged services had been recorded.  Significantly, inspection 
downhill from the wall, the area not directly supported by the 
shear enhancement, showed no tension cracking or down slope 
movement away from the front of the minipile wall.  This 
indicates that the consequential improved FoS had also 




SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
 
The case history of the Giant’s Seat Landslip shows clearly 
what the key role that geotechnical engineering can take in the 
management of ground risk and protection of assets.  The desk 
study information gathered allowed detailed consideration of 
the slope stability problem and development of the optimum 
solution for stabilisation.  The  site investigation  was focussed  
 
to provide the data required for design of the mini-pile wall. 
The instrumentation provided invaluable information on the 
location of the slip surface and the rate of movement of the 
slip.  It was also a valuable tool enabling the monitoring of 
change in the slope behaviour during the construction phase 
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